I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom holds that optimal abatement subsidy rates should be differentiated across firms according to the (actual or imputed) marginal damages created by a firm's emissions (Baumol and Oates 1988; Hanley, Shogren, and White 1997) . In this paper we explore how this conventional wisdom changes when subsidy expenditures are constrained by a regulatory budget. The obvious impact is that fewer environmental gains will be achieved when the budget is constrained, but this is not our focus. Rather, we focus on the less-obvious impact that subsidy rates developed under a limited budget may be optimally differentiated to target, in addition to marginal damages, features such as abatement costs, income transfer, and producer participation.
The degree to which subsidy rates optimally target these other features depends on how the subsidy is implemented, or more specifically, on how abatement is defined. Abatement is a reduction in emissions from some benchmark level. (EQIP) funds newly adopted practices. implicitly setting the benchmark at the level of emission or conservation effort the producer employed before entering the program-which we refer to as a historic benchmark. But this does not have to be the case. Indeed, the benchmark is technically a policy variable (Baumol and Oates 1988, 217) and of particular concern when the budget is constrained.' For example, producers can enroll land in the recently implemented Conservation Security Program (CSP) only after soil quality and water quality concerns have been addressed-quite different from EQIP where the producers' own history of emission or conservation effort is the benchmark. While this choice of CSP benchmark was driven largely by budget and equity concerns, the choice of benchmark affects the level of environmental gain that can be achieved with a given budget. Ultimately, the choice of benchmark affects the optimal choice of subsidy rates, even if the subsidy rates themselves are unrestricted. 'The driving force behind this result is the impact that the benchmark has on the regulator's ability to price discriminate when purchasing environmental benefits. Without this ability, tradeoffs will arise Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. The usually disclaimer applies.
The benchmark can be chosen in any way-with no bearing on optimal subsidy rates-as long as the lump sum component of the subsidy, defined as the subsidy rate times the benchmark, is not made contingent on the firm's decision to stay in business (Baumol and Oates 1988, 216) . among income, participation, costs and benefits, and the optimal subsidy rates should reflect these tradeoffs.
There is increasing political pressure to rely more heavily on green payments programs in the United States and abroad to generate environmental gains and provide an alternative source of farm income (Batie 1999; Hanley et al. 1998; Feng 2002) . Accordingly, tradeoffs among income, participation, costs, and benefits are a common theme in economic discussions surrounding green payments for agriculture (Batie 1999; Feng 2002) . Policy discussions surrounding the development of programs like EQIP or CSP have perhaps focused more on distributional consequences than on efficiency consequences. Here, we show these issues may be intertwined.
The issues discussed in this paper are related to the broader literature on secondbest policy instruments for agriculture, although prior literature focuses primarily on restrictions that prevent instruments from perfectly targeting the externality (e.g., uniformly applied instruments in situations where differentiated instruments would be more efficient, or incentives based on only a few of the input choices influencing emissions; Helfand and House 1995; Larson, Helfand, and House 1996) . A first-best outcome is unattainable when the restrictions result in a smaller number of instruments than the number of policy concerns (Tinbergen 1952) , so that the externality can only be imperfectly targeted. Our analysis involves targeting budgetary concerns as well as environmental concerns, making the benchmark an important choice. Our analysis begins with an analytical model of green payments. The analytical results are then explored using a numerical model of agricultural nutrient pollution.
II. A MODEL OF POLLUTION
We begin with a simple analytical model of agricultural pollution to investigate optimal green payments policy choices when policymakers are faced with a budget constraint. For simplicity, we ignore the complexities of price effects for now, although we consider this in the numerical section below. Define r .(x1 ) to be the ith (iEQ = { 1.... .n}) farm's expected emissions (e.g., runoff), which depend on the farm's vector of input choices, x 1 . Farm i's costs of reducing mean emissions are given by (jr), with c < 0, c' > 0.2 At the ith producer's level of unregulated mean emissions, r?, emission reduction is zero and, hence,c1(r?) = 0. When emissions are reduced, that is, when r < r, then cost is positive, that is, c (r) > 0. Suppose each of the n farms contributes pollution to a body of water. The expected pollutant load delivered to the water body is given by a = wr,, where o)i is the expected deliver-y tcoefficient representing the mean proportion of emissions from farm i that are actually delivered to the water body. The delivery coefficient also represents the marginal benefits of pollution control, in terms of the reduction in expected pollutant loads. 3 The linear specification for expected pollutant loads is a first-order approximation to the actual delivery process. It is believed to be reasonable in many instances (Roth and Jury 1993) , and it is consistent with regional models such as SPARROW (Smith, Schwarz, and Alexander 1997) .
III. COST-EFFECTIVE GREEN PAYMENTS
A standard approach to analyzing pollution problems is to consider cost-effective allocations that achieve an environmental goal at least cost or that minimize expected 2 The focus on abatement costs is standard, and is not necessarily at odds with the belief that risk-averse farmers tend to "over-fertilize" as long as costs in this case are viewed as an expenditure function associated with achieving a particular level of expected utility. Otherwise, it is true that farmers who over-fertilize would have the ability to reduce their use of wasted fertilizer, thereby saving money and implying a negative cost to emissions reduction.
To be clear, by "benefits" we do not mean to imply reductions in economic or ecological damages, each of which is more likely to be nonlinear in the pollutant. Rather, our interest is only in presenting a single measure of environmental pressure: delivered loads. loads subject to a constraint on pollution control costs.4 Throughout this paper we limit our definition of pollution control costs to the resource costs incurred by firms in reducing their emissions. Costs therefore do not include government subsidy payments, as these are simply transfer payments.5
We begin with the cost-effective outcome so that we may compare conventional, costeffective subsidies with budget-constrained subsidies. Specifically, suppose subsidies are based on reductions in mean emissions and they are designed to maximize environmental quality, or alternatively, to minimize ambient pollution levels subject to producer responses to the subsidies and subject to an upper bound on pollution control costs. The producer response constraints reflect the fact that this is a two-stage game (first producers respond to the subsidy parameters and then the regulator uses this information to set the parameters optimally). The cost constraint limits cost and, therefore, emission reduction to a level policymakers believe is concomitant with cost. Thus, the cost-constrained problem yields a first-best solution (at least in the context of the minimization problem being considered, but not necessarily from an efficiency perspective) which serves as a base of comparison for the budget constrained Such allocations are not generally efficient in the sense of maximizing net social welfare, but are often analyzed because economic damages are seldom known.
There may be costs associated with diverting funds to this environmental problem, as well as transactions costs associated with the provision of subsidies (Alston and Hurd 1990) . These costs are implicit in the choice of the level of the budget constraint, B, introduced below.
6 Typically, analyses of the design of first-best subsidy rates often do not use firm responses as constraints. Rather, the following logic is applied: (1) in the efficient outcome we find that marginal abatement costs (MC) should equal the marginal external benefits of abatement (MB), that is, MC = MB; (2) the firm faced with an abatement subsidy rate of s will set MC = s; (3) comparing these two conditions we see that s MB is optimal. If firm participation was not an issue (which it is not in the absence of a budget constraint), then we could follow this same approach. But the current approach is useful because it is symmetric with the approach that must be used to analyze the budget-constrained problem below, and therefore provides insights into similarities and differences that arise between the two problems. models (i.e., minimizing expected loads subject to a constraint on government subsidy expenditures) discussed below.6
Given subsidies of the form, max {s (?, -r1) , O}, where si is the subsidy rate and ?) is the benchmark from which subsidy payments are evaluated, the cost-effective minimization problem is written
where T in constraint [21 represents an aggregate cost target, r(s,) is defined in constraint [3] to be the ith producer's optimal emissions response to the subsidy rate (i.e., the solution to -c = si in the case of a positive subsidy), and cP is the subset of participating producers with complement ', that is, cI i UJi = and = 0. Constraint [3] characterizes the producer's reaction to the subsidy program and states that the policymaker leverages emission reduction only to the extent that producers respond to the subsidy program. Constraint [4] states that producers will participate only if their subsidy payments exceed their pollution control costs. Implicitly, 0, is an endogenous response to this choice. The first-best solution is the set of subsidies at the producer-specific rate s =w il^pcj(i.e., the imputed value of the marginal impacts of the producer's mean emissions), where p < 0 is the shadow value of the cost constraint [2] and the superscript C denotes this is the solution to the cost-effective problem. The subsidy rate does not include a shadow value for constraint [4] because that shadow value is zero when all producers participate, so that all i are in the set 0. Full participation is optimal so long as c (r) = 0 for all producers and abatement is a Continuous variable. In other words, the first unit of abatement is always gained at a very low cost. If Ic(0)J is sufficiently large for each producer, ambient pollution is minimized for a given aggregate cost target T, if and only if the resulting minimized ambient pollution level is achieved at least cost, that is, if the
V/,j holds. The differentiated subsidy rates defined above ensure this condition holds as long as there is full participation. To ensure full participation, it is also necessary to set the benchmark levels i 7i such that the subsidy payment basis, [ -i(sflj, and hence the subsidy payments, are large enough to cover costs. With no budget constraints in effect, the benchmarks have no marginal effects on either the objective function or the cost constraint, and so there are no first-order conditions to guide the particular choices of benchmarks. The benchmarks can he set at any level as long as costs are covered by the associated subsidy payments. It is generally sufficient (but not necessary) to set i, = r, where r is the ith producer's level of unregulated mean emissions (i.e., the solution to = 0). In this, the most-often-considered Case, producers are paid a constant rate for each unit of abatement. This provides them with rents because the subsidy rate equals their equilibrium marginal abatement cost, which is greater than their average abatement cost. These rents are not a problem in the cost-constrained problem because policymakers care only about the cost of abatement, not about government expenditures.
In the first-best solution, differentiated subsidy rates are required to address the externality and benchmarks need to be set so that all producers participate (since participation under this policy is voluntary). Benchmarks need not he differentiated, but differentiation can be used to adjust the level of income transfer (rents) to individual producers as the subsidy component .s 1i i represents a lump sum payment that is varied by changing the benchmark.7 Therefore, with no constraints on how Policy instruments can be designed and implemented, we have a cost-effective policy with full participation in which the resulting income distribution can he adjusted.
IV. A BUDGET CONSTRAINT
Agri-environ mental programs do not have unlimited funds, so consider what happens when we incorporate the following budget constraint
where B is the available program budget.
The budget constraint implicitly limits abatement costs, since farms will not abate more than the amount that the subsidies pay for. Therefore, the budget constraint will be a more stringent constraint than the cost constraint when B < T. In general, we expect that either the cost constraint [2] or the budget constraint [5] will hind, but not both. In this section we focus on the budgetconstrained problem, assuming B < T. We show that the analytical form of the perunit subsidy rate is the same as in the costconstrained problem, although the level of the subsidy will differ and lead to smaller abatement levels in the budget-constrained outcome (due to the more stringent constraint). Further, unlike the cost-constrained case, we find a need for a very specific set of benchmarks.
Suppose constraint [5] hinds and [2] is
non-binding (so that p = 0). The Lagrangian for this problem is Baumol and Oates (1998. chapter 14) point out that si' is not lump sum if it influences the producer's decision to stay in business. They also point out that pollution abatement subsidies are not efficient because they reduce average costs and thereby encourage excessive entry that can actually increase overall pollution levels. Subsidies in our model are only offered to a pre-defined set of eligible producers. and so potential entrants would not be induced by the subsidy. participating producers' benchmarks are optimally set at the farm-specific level, -.
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where 2 < 0 is the shadow value of the budget constraint and 41 j 0 is the shadow value of the ith producer's participation constraint. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are L/ dr, -,5, -0101] c/Si 
These subsidy rates are analytically equivalent to the first-best rates, although with (-),) in the denominator as opposed to (-p). Tithe budget imposes more of a constraint than does the cost constraint, it must be that (_A*)> (-p) so that the budgetconstrained subsidy rates are smaller than the cost-constrained ones, with subsidy rates being positively related to the size of B.
Lower subsidy rates, in turn, produce less abatement-a direct result of the more stringent constraint imposed by the budget.
Optimally, the budget constraint should be satisfied as an equality-if money is available, it can be spent to further reduce ambient pollution. Similarly, the participation constraints should optimally bind for
where Orri = [dc1dr7] [r7/c7] is the elasticity of producer i's pollution control costs with respect to mean emissions, and the superscript (*) indicates that variables are evaluated at their second-best values given the budget restriction. The first term on the RHS of the first equality is the optimal level of emissions. The second term, c1(r7)1s71 represents the emissions reduction (i.e., equal to r7 -r7) for which a subsidy is provided, chosen so that each producer's subsidy payment equals cost. The terms following the second equality in equation [10] are akin to an equilibrium condition for a third-degree price-discriminating monopsonist, although with prices and quantities reversed in [10] relative to conventional monopsony conditions. The regulator is a monopsonist in the market for pollution control. But in contrast to a conventional monopsony, in which the monopsonist discriminates with respect to price, the monopsonist in this case uses quantity (the benchmark) to discriminately affect the lump sum component of the subsidy. Also, unlike conventional thirddegree price-discrimination, the regulator in this instance is able to perfectly discriminate among producers to extract all rents from them. With no rents accruing to individual farmers, the regulator only pays for the total cost of pollution control. Analogous to the case of a cost constraint, ambient pollution is therefore minimized for a given Given complete control over all choice variables, the optimal budget-constrained policy differs from the first-best policy in two respects: (1) subsidy rates are lower, which means environmental quality is reduced, although the resulting outcome is still achieved in a cost-effective manner, and (2) income transfer no longer occurs, as this would come at the expense of environmental improvements.
Next, we explore the more realistic case in which there are restrictions on the use of instruments so that targeting becomes imperfect. Specifically, the regulatory authority might not have flexibility to set benchmarks as in [10] . Rather, it might be constrained by some exogenous rule such as setting benchmark emissions at unregulated levels, i.e., rj = r, or setting benchmarks uniformly for all producers, i.e., F, = F V i. We begin with the uniform case.
V. CONSTRAINING BENCHMARKS TO BE UNIFORM
Suppose the benchmark levels were required to be uniform across producers. The uniformity requirement could apply to absolute levels or to percentage reductions from unregulated emissions. The analysis for each case is analogous, and so we focus on absolute levels for simplicity, that is,
First order condition [7] is unchanged by this assumption (except that F is substituted for F1). Condition [8] is affected, however, and intuitively this could have implications for the optimal level of participation. The necessary condition for the choice of benchmark is
With a uniform benchmark and heterogeneous producers, it will only be possible to ensure zero rents for one producer-generally, the highest abatement cost producer at the endogenously-chosen level F. Without loss, we denote this producer earning zero rents as i = I or the marginal producer (the other participating producers earn rents for being more efficient abaters). Hence, 4, = 0 Producer i's optimal subsidy rate is a relative price equaling the ratio of his imputed marginal damages relative to the marginal external costs of subsidizing the producer. The optimal subsidy rate would equal the marginal damages if there was no opportunity cost of subsidization (i.e., if r = i so that the total subsidy paid to producer i is zero and the denominator would equal unity). Since the opportunity costs are positive, i > r, this means a larger subsidy rate for producer i reduces the funds available for abatement by other producers. The denominator of [14] reflects these additional costs at the margin, capturing how the agency is a monopsonist in the market for abatement, with -e.T representing the degree of monopsony power. But while the denominator exhibits similarities to a conventional (non-discriminatory) monopsony condition, there are at least two important differences. First, in the present case abatement "prices" and quantities are linked through a budget constraint as opposed to a factor market. A second difference from a conventional monopsony is that the regulator here does price discriminate across producers, but not simply to extract rents. Rather, the regulator attempts to balance environmental gain against public expenditure. Given the subsidy rate, alone, the regulator cannot eliminate payment of rents to producers and achieve environmental goals at an overall minimum level of public expenditure, which would he equal to the cost of achieving environmental gains when the regulator can set producer-specific benchmarks and eliminate rents. The denominator in [14] is typical of the additional terms that arise for second-best incentives to reflect the impact of the incentive on externalities or distortions that the regulator is unable to perfectly target in a secondbest world (e.g., Baumol and Oates). As the denominator of [14] is positive, its effect is to reduce the subsidy rate. For firms with a relatively high payment basis (i -r,*) per unit of emissions, reducing the subsidy rate also results in freeing a relatively large of amount of budget (when compared to a similar change in the subsidy rate for a producer with a lower payment basis) that can be used to leverage environmental gains elsewhere. On the other hand, where abatement is more responsive to a subsidy increase (i.e., cj is large) regulators can make larger payments than to producers where abatement is less responsive. As responsiveness is inversely related to marginal abatement costs and the payment basis is directly related to rent transfer, subsidies are targeted to reflect marginal abatement costs and producer rents in addition to a producer's imputed marginal damages.8
Unlike the subsidy rates in [9] , the subsidies in [14] will not reduce ambient pollution cost-effectively because they reflect more than just the benefits of abatement. The resulting ambient pollution level will not be achieved at the lowest possible abatement cost, but rather at least public expenditure. This is because the benchmark is constrained to he uniform across producers where this expenditure includes both costs and rents as a result of the uniform benchmark constraint leading to rent transfers. Note that both the uniform benchmark and the budget constraint are required for this tradeoff to emerge because, as indicated above, the tradeoff does not arise when only one of these constraints holds.
Now consider the case of the marginal producer. We can solve condition [11] for 41 ! -). = 2E .s',/s i . Using this relation, the necessary dndition [7] for producer i = 1 can be written as 
The marginal producer's subsidy equals the producer's marginal damages plus an extra term that is increasing in the aggregate subsidy rates paid to other producers but decreasing in producer l's elasticity of costs with respect to the subsidy (t). Producer 1 receives a bonus relative to the other producers because this marginal producer does not receive an income transfer as do the others. It is therefore in the public interest to pay this producer slightly more than the marginal damages (and at the same time reduce payments to others if the budget is to be maintained), because the marginal producer applies the entire subsidy payment to pollution control. Of course, the public incentives to provide this bonus vary inversely with producer l's elasticity of costs with respect to the subsidy. If a marginal increase in the subsidy rate leads to more abatement but at a significantly higher cost, then a large bonus is not very cost-effective.
Finally, the optimal uniform benchmark is calculated as in [10] to ensure the marginal producer earns zero rents:9 = 1- 11 -] . [17] Assuming the marginal producer does not have the smallest marginal abatement costs overall (e.g., the producer is a medium-scale polluter), this benchmark could be set at a relatively large value. Smaller-scale polluters would not benefit from the large benchmark as long as the subsidy rates are adjusted to limit participation.
VI. CONSTRAINING BENCHMARLKS TO HISTORICAL LEVELS
Now consider the case where benchmarks are set at historical levels, that is, Ti = r. In this case, the necessary condition for optimization is condition [7] ; condition [8] is no longer relevant. Moreover, each producer who is offered a positive subsidy rate will participate, with each participating producer earning positive rents (due to convex abatement costs); hence, çb = 0 V1(=-P. Given these outcomes, the form of the second-best subsidy rates for this case are as defined in [14]-even for the marginal producer except that the benchmark varies across farms and is fixed. Given this difference in the benchmarks and also differences in the resulting set of participating producers relative to the uniform benchmark scenario, the levels of s" will differ from those arising under uniform benchmarks because the right hand side of [14] will be evaluated at different points in the present case. Still, as for the case of uniform benchmarks, the resulting environmental outcome will not be attained at least cost, as tradeoffs arise among cost, benefit, and income targeting due to the combination of the budget and benchmark constraints. Participation could also be affected if it is deemed optimal to set .s, = 0 for some producers. t° This latter outcome, which would arise when the environmental gain per unit of expenditure is not large enough to justify offering a positive subsidy, cannot be ruled out. However, since any producer who is offered even a small subsidy will abate a correspondingly small amount and therefore will receive minimal rents, targeting on the basis of participation Another interesting case, which we do not consider here due to our focus on restrictions related to the benchmark as opposed to subsidy rates, is that of benchmark restrictions in combination with uniform subsidy rates. Optimal uniform subsidy rates in this case would simply be a weighted average of the values defined by [14] . The key difference here, however, is that the regulator cannot individually adjust subsidy rates (e.g., to zero) to discourage participation among some producers. If benchmarks are set to historical levels, there is no way to limit participation and significant rent transfers might reduce the potential for environmental gains. If benchmarks were set uniformly, then this value could be varied to affect participation. Somewhat paradoxically, lowering a uniform benchmark to limit participation would tend to crowd out large-scale polluters: exactly the Opposite of the ease where subsidy rates could be independentl y varied. This is because a large uniform benchmark results in substantial rent transfers to small-scale polluters (possibly for doing nothing!), resulting in a smaller subsidy rate for encouraging environmental improvements. 
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We now develop a numerical example to help clarify the theory. Consider eight hypothetical farms. Farm i's costs of reducing mean emissions are given by c(r1 ) = (r ? -ri )", where qj is a parameter, the value of which is greater than unity to ensure convexity of G (r). Each farm is therefore characterized by initial runoff, r, a cost parameter, t, and a delivery parameter, w1. The cost parameter is assumed to be constant across all farms: ,j = 2, which results in a linear marginal cost function. In a non-hypothetical setting, setting ij = 2 would imply that the marginal cost function is a first-order approximation and the cost function is a second-order approximation to the true functions. The other parameters were selected at random from uniform distributions involving the following intervals: [0.4, 11 for initial runoff, and [0.2, 0.9] for the delivery coefficients (see Table 1 for values). The lower bound of 0.4 is chosen to ensure initial runoff levels are sufficiently positive. The bounds for the delivery coefficients reflect the fact that only a fraction of a farm's emissions are delivered to the water resource. Three policy scenarios are considered: (1) optimally set benchmarks, where policy variables are set according to equations [9] and [10], (2) historical benchmarks, where ri = r and subsidy rates are set according to equations [14] , and (3) uniform benchmarks, where policy variables are set according to equations [14] , [16], and [17] .
The numerical model was solved for five budgets, B: 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 . Farmby-farm results for B=0.3 for the optimal, historical, and uniform benchmark scenarios are given in Tables 1-3 , respectively. First, compare the optimal and historical benchmark scenarios in Tables 1 and 2 . As expected, there is full participation by producers in both of these scenarios. Subsidy rates are uniformly higher in the optimal scenario, as the individual benchmarks are adjusted so that the entire budget is used to fund pollution control in this scenario (so that total payments equals total costs). In contrast, benchmarks cannot he adjusted in the historical scenario, and so the budget has to be divided between funding pollution control and providing rents to producers. Indeed, each producer earns rents in the amount of 50% of the budget (regardless of the level of budget) under the historical scenario because marginal cost is linear for = 2 and because both abatement costs and subsidy payments are evaluated according to the historical runoff levels. With less money to spend on abatement, subsidy rates are lower, as is the percentage reduction in delivered loads under the two scenarios (28.7% reduction in the optimal scenario versus 20.4% reduction under the historical scenario). Finally, it is perhaps interesting to note that the subsidy rates in the historical case are almost perfectly correlated with the optimal subsidies, which in turn are perfectly positively correlated with the transport coefficients (because, from equation [9] , the optimal subsidy rates are proportional to the transport coefficients). The correlation between the subsidy rates and transport coefficients in the uniform case is not a general result, however, Under the current specification, equation [13] reduces to s, --I ) (s,/,j) and only occurs in the present case because = 2 for each farm.'' Now consider the uniform benchmark scenario (Table 3 ) and how this compares to the other two scenarios. For a uniform benchmark, only farms I and 6 participate when B = 0.3, with farm 6 being the marginal farm. These two farms have both the largest delivery coefficients and the smallest initial runoff levels. The large delivery coefficients mean that runoff reductions translate into relatively large reductions in nutrient loadings. However, the small initial runoff levels means that these producers could earn significant rents if the baseline is not set at a low level. The result is that the uniform runoff benchmark (0.24) is well below baseline levels (roughly 0.42) to eliminate rents while the subsidy rates are set high to maximize the reduction of delivered loads among the participating farms. While this is the best possible outcome when using a uniform benchmark, the uniform restriction means that participation is necessarily limited. Farms other than I and 6 do not participate because the benchmark is so low, but setting the benchmark higher would only redirect budgetary resources away from pollution control and towards producer rents: the larger benchmarks would increase rents to farms I and 6 while encouraging participation by farms having smaller delivery coefficients.
Comparing the results of the uniform scenario to those of the optimal scenario, we see that the optimal scenario results in a 12% additional reduction in delivered loads for roughly the same a batement cost. Hence, focusing the entire budget on two farms results in inefficiently high subsidy rates and large percentage load reductions by those farms. Even though these subsidy rates are optimal given the restriction of a uniform benchmark, less expensive reductions (in terms of producer cost, not government expenditure) are possible when the restriction is removed. Comparing the results of the uniform scenario to those of the historical scenario, we find that the historical scenario results in a 4 1/0 additional reduction in delivered loads for half the abatement cost, with the rest of the budget going towards producer rents. Relative to the uniform scenario, producers would be happier with the historical scenario and the environmental gains would he larger.
For larger budget levels, all farms participate in the uniform benchmark scenario (Table 4) . In these cases, increasing subsidy rates at the margin for farms 1 and 6 is more costly, in terms of load reduction, than paying rents to other producers in order to tap into their less costly load reductions. Going from a budget of 0.3 to 0. dramatically, even as the environmental outcome changes only marginally. The benchmark rises to roughly 0.8 while subsidy rates are far below previous levels. In terms of economic outcomes. the percentage of the budget dissipated in rents increases from 3% to 52°/. Environmentally, delivered loads decline from 84% of initial levels to 81%. Spreading out abatement effort dramatically lowered the actual cost of abatement, as loading declined even as producer rents increased sharply. Finally , consider the issue of targeting of the subsidy rates by farm. In the optimal benchmark scenario, targeting occurs according to a farm's delivery coefficient. In the uniform scenario, however, there is essentially no relation between the two, as the correlation between the subsidy rate and transport coefficient is -0.031 in this case (and falls to -0.001 when B = 0.5; see Table 5 ). In contrast, the correlation between subsidy rates and income transfer (0.81) and the correlation between subsidy rates and costs (0.97) are much higher. gains are highest for the optimal benchmark scenario to all others, and higher for the historical benchmarks compared with the uniform benchmark. In particular, the difference in loadings between the nonuniform benchmark and other benchmarks is increased as the budget is increased. All producers prefer the historical scenario at low budget levels (when there is partial participation in the uniform scenario). At higher budget levels, some producers -but not all -will prefer the uniform scenario. While the marginal producer receives no rents, overall high levels of rents imply that some will be better off than under the historical scenario. Generally, the least efficient scenario in which there is full participation results in the largest overall income transfer to producers.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our emphasis on the subsidy benchmark and budget constraints is particularly relevant to recent and ongoing conservation policy debates. In U.S. agri-environmental policy, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) represents the traditional approach employing a historical benchmark: cost-sharing for the installation of adoption of new practices that will produce additional environmental benefits. The Conservation Security Program (CSP), created by the 2002 farm bill, represents an alternate approach under which the benchmark is established irrespective of producers' pre-program history and producers can be rewarded for past conservation efforts. Funding for both programs is limited.
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We have analyzed the design of subsidies based on abatement and found that setting subsidy rates equal to the (imputed) marginal benefits of abatement is not necessarily optimal when a budget constraint is introduced and when the regulatory authority is restricted in setting the subsidy benchmark, which determines the payment basis. When thô benchmark is restricted, optimal subsidy rates target marginal costs and income transfer to producers in addition to marginal benefits. The upshot is that tradeoffs emerge between targeting on the basis of benefits, costs, income transfer, and participation. Numerically, we found that the optimal subsidy rates, in the context of a uniform benchmark, were essentially uncorrelated with benefits, given a budget large enough to optimally fund a large, diverse group of producers.
